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Abstract—With the release of Amazon Alexa and the first
Amazon Echo device, the company revolutionised the smart
home. It allowed their users to communicate with, and control,
their smart home ecosystem purely using voice commands.
However, this also means that Amazon processes and stores
a large amount of personal data about their users, as these
devices are always present and always listening in peoples’ private
homes. That makes this data a valuable source of evidence
for investigators performing digital forensics. The Alexa Voice
Service uses a series of APIs for communication between clients
and the Amazon cloud. These APIs return a wide range of data
related to the functionality of the device used.
The first goal of this research was to clarify exactly what
kind of information about the user is stored and accessible
through these APIs. To do this, a combination of literature
review and exploratory analysis was used to establish a list of
all relevant APIs. Then, possible artefacts and conclusions to
be drawn from their responses were identified and presented.
Lastly, the perspective of the users was taken, and options for
improving their privacy were reviewed. Specifically, the history
of interaction between the user and Alexa is available through
multiple APIs, and there are several options to delete it. It was
determined that these options have different behaviours and that
most of them do not remove all data related to user interaction.
Index Terms—Amazon, Alexa, Echo, IoT, smart home,
forensics, privacy, API.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the usage of devices connected to the Internet of
Things (IoT) has increased significantly. A lot of these devices
can be attributed to the concept of the “smart home”, which is
intended to provide convenience in day-to-day activities. This
leads to the fact that they tend to record and sometimes store a
lot of personal data belonging to their users. This data often not
only describes the user directly, but also their daily schedules
and their habits. In the case of wearable smart devices,
critical medical information may even be processed, stored,
and transmitted. All of this is highly sensitive information,
which should be kept private and secured appropriately.
Within the smart home, there is one type of device in
particular that stands out, which is the virtual personal assist-
ant, such as Google Home or Amazon Echo with the Alexa
assistant service. They are meant to be the user’s interface to
connect to their smart home and can pick up voice commands
and interpret them accordingly to control other devices and
services, either by using voice commands or scheduled actions.
Therefore, the device turns into a hub that is connected to
every smart device in the house, which in turn also means
that it gets access to a variety of personal data about its users.
Examples could be identifying sleep habits by checking when
light bulbs are turned on, deducing a person’s health from
examining heart rates from a smartwatch, or more personal
traits extracted from recordings of conversations.
To be able to provide basic functionality, virtual personal
assistants necessarily need to record audio and process it. In
the case of Amazon Alexa for example, the device listens for
someone to say the word “Alexa”, which is its trigger to start
recording and processing. Therefore, Alexa needs to constantly
record audio to be able to pick up the command. Because
interpreting audio is a complex challenge, the processing
is usually not performed on the local device. Rather, the
recordings are sent to Amazon’s servers, where the bulk of
processing takes place.
Unfortunately, since these systems are all closed source, it
is difficult to determine what processing is applied to data
gathered by Alexa. While it is clear that at least some of the
data is sent to Amazon, it is unknown how the company then
handles this information. Bloomberg recently discovered [1]
that Amazon employees had access to voice recordings of
customers, and actively listened to them to improve Alexa’s
voice recognition system. According to the source, employees
“transcribed and annotated” the recordings, and sometimes
even heard conversations. In an extreme case, two employees
reportedly even listened to a case of sexual assault. Other vir-
tual assistant devices face similar problems. The Guardian [2]
reports that certain contractors of Google have access to voice
recordings. This was admitted by Google following a recent
incident where some of these recordings were leaked. This is
especially critical considering that the Amazon Echo device is
usually placed directly in peoples’ homes, and can therefore
record a lot of very private details and conversations.
According to Gartner [3], the adoption of such devices will
increase drastically in the next few years. While in 2016 the
market value of virtual personal assistant devices was at $720
million, it is projected to rise to $3.52 billion by 2021, almost
five times as much. This clearly illustrates how these issues
will become very relevant in the future.
Due to the amount of data processed and stored by them,
these devices are becoming more and more relevant for crim-
inal investigations, since they can potentially contain important
evidence in cases such as domestic violence. Amazon has
already been ordered to hand out data gathered by Echo
devices as part of the evidence in criminal trials. In the US,
a judge ordered Amazon to hand over data from an Echo
device that was used in a house where a double homicide
was committed in January 2017 [4]. Specifically, existing voice
recordings as well as information on cellular devices that were
paired with the Echo during this time. The same thing occurred
in 2015 when another Echo device was seized during the
investigation of a suspected murder in Arkansas [5]. In this
case, Amazon only agreed to hand over data after the suspect
had agreed to it. These investigations make use of digital
forensics techniques in order to preserve potential pieces of
evidence from these devices, and to identify the parts that
allow conclusions about a certain situation.
II. AMAZON ECHO & AMAZON ALEXA
The Amazon Echo is a family of intelligent virtual assistant
devices that come in different form factors and with different
featuresAt the core, however, they all contain a microphone
and a speaker and interact with the Amazon Alexa voice ser-
vice which allows the user to control it using voice commands.
As such, they combine technologies related to the Internet of
Things as well as cloud computing. As mentioned before, these
devices have recently started to raise interest as sources of
digital evidence for criminal investigations. However, because
the technology is relatively new, research on how best to
extract forensics evidence from such devices is still in its early
stages. This section will provide an overview of the devices’
functionality, as well as a summary of the current state of
research in the area of Amazon Echo forensics.
The Echo product family consists of several products,
among which are the classic Echo, the smaller Echo Dot and
the Echo Show, which also contains a small display to show
additional information. The Echo is capable of performing
several tasks that are meant to support users during their daily
lives. It is possible to ask the device questions to search on the
Internet, it can convert scientific units and currencies, present
the current time and weather, and more. Additionally, one can
have it set timers and reminders and create to-do or shopping
lists. Another big aspect is that the Echo can also control third-
party hardware and software that is connected to it. It can
control light bulbs or central heating system, as well as play
music from several streaming services.
Lastly, the user can also define so-called skills. These skills
can be invoked by specific voice commands and can trigger
arbitrary actions by the Echo. For example, a certain skill that
is invoked by saying "Alexa, set the mood" could prompt the
Echo to dim the lights in a room and start playing a certain
music playlist.
A. Network structure
The setup of an Echo device is done through a so-called
"companion app", which can either be a specific application
on Android or iOS devices, or the Amazon Alexa Web page
at https://alexa.amazon.com. During setup, the Echo connects
to a local wireless network. After that, it is in constant contact
with Amazon’s cloud environment. In fact, if the Echo is not
connected to the Internet, it does not work, because all the
voice commands are processed in the cloud, and not locally
on the device.
Voice commands to the device are triggered using a specific
wake word, such as "Alexa", or "Echo". When this word
is said, the device starts recording audio and transmits the
recording to the Alexa Voice Service (AVS) for processing,
which then returns an appropriate response to the device,
where it is returned to the user through the speaker [6]. This
means that the device’s microphone is always turned on, as
it needs to be able to detect the wake word. According to
Amazon, however, no recordings are saved without the wake
word [7]. Additionally, all data pertaining to the Echo can be
managed through the companion apps mentioned before. After
the setup is complete, the Echo device and the companion
apps do not communicate directly with each other. They
are both connected to the Amazon cloud, which acts as a
communication proxy.
B. Forensic Approaches
After identifying devices that might be of interest in an
investigation, the investigator must then acquire data from
them, which might potentially contain relevant pieces of
evidence [8].
Timelines of events that occurred during the situation in
question are among the most valuable pieces of evidence,
especially if they include information such as timestamps or
location details [9]. If timestamps are involved, problems can
arise regarding different time zones. It is therefore important
to consider that different data sources may yield data with
different time zones or formats, which should then be nor-
malised. To achieve this, certain tools can be employed that
visualise timelines in a graphical format. This can give the
investigator an overview of the relevant events in a way that
allows them to see the big picture. These events can come
from many different sources, including creating, modifying or
deleting a file, log file entries, network activity and more.
There have been several approaches to forensically analyse
Amazon Echo that yielded detailed information about how
the device communicates with the Amazon cloud and what
types of data are processed. Orr and Sanchez [10] performed a
study to confirm whether data processed by an Amazon Echo
device could be a valuable source of evidence for criminal
investigations. In order to achieve this, they had a family use an
Echo device in their daily lives for 10 weeks. Afterwards, they
extracted information mainly from the Amazon Alexa Web
page. The conclusion to their analysis was that the data can
indeed contain relevant artefacts for an investigation. Among
these artefacts are records of voice interactions between the
user and Alexa including timestamps, traffic information with
location details as well as to-do and shopping lists. They poin-
ted out that all this evidence can provide valuable information
about a suspect. However, it should always be used together
with additional sources.
Chung et al. [6] also discussed the topic of forensic ap-
proaches to Amazon Alexa. They focused on technical details
for methods of analysis. They combined aspects of cloud
forensics with client-side forensics by analysing both Alexa
API responses and local artefacts. They also proposed a toolkit
that facilitates identifying and gathering various forensic arte-
facts through API calls to the Amazon Alexa service.
Most of the traffic between the Echo and Amazon’s servers
is encrypted with TLS v1.2. Data exchanges between the two
are performed using a predefined API, to which the Echo
can send requests that return data in JSON format. There
is however no official documentation that contains details
about which API calls exist and what data they return. There
have been multiple attempts to reverse-engineer this API,
which have revealed a number of interesting API calls. Owen
Piette published a blog post [11] on his Website explaining
how he was able to extract some API calls by looking at
which requests his browser sent when he was using the Alexa
Web application. Chung et al. [6] then took this further by
extensively analysing network communications, browser cache
artefacts and data stored by the available companion apps.
Through this, they were able to identify almost 20 different
APIs which cover all functionality of the Echo device.
During the analysis of the companion apps on Android and
iOS, Chung et al. [6] realised that both contained databases
with certain cached data sets that were originally obtained
by the application through the APIs mentioned above. Also,
the authors investigated potential cached values related to
the Alexa Web application, where they found several HTTP
requests to the API, as well as cached responses.
These investigations allowed Chung et al. [6] to piece
together a comprehensive list of APIs that the Echo device
uses to transfer and receive data to and from the Amazon Alexa
cloud. The researchers defined seven categories, in which they
divided the APIs according to the type of data they returned.
These categories can be seen in table I. The table contains the
name of each category, a short description, as well as examples
for the data sets that are part of it. In the original paper, the
last category is called ETC. For this paper, it was renamed
to Audio Data, since the only API in this category allows the
users to access audio recordings of their voice commands.
Li et al. [12] presented a new process for performing
forensic analyses on IoT devices. Like conventional processes,
their approach is based on the four stages: identification,
preservation, analysis and presentation, all of which are spe-
cifically adjusted for the Internet of Things. Following this,
they performed a forensic analysis using this process on an
Amazon Echo device. Their main sources of evidence are
cached artefacts stored by the Amazon Alexa companion app
on both Android and iOS, as well as the Alexa Web page. They
defined different groups for the data they identified during their
research. In their paper, they present four categories, as can be
seen in table II. The focus of this list is slightly different. While
Chung et al. [6] analysed the whole Alexa environment, Li et
Category Description Examples
Account Information about the currently
logged in Amazon account
name, email ad-
dress, user ID
Alexa-
enabled
Device
A list of all registered devices that
use the Alexa Voice Service (Echo
devices), including basic device in-
formation
name, serial num-
ber, software ver-
sion
Customer
Setting
Device-independent settings associ-
ated with the current user account
Saved Wifi
credentials, third-
party services,
location data
Skill All the skills, both custom-made and
from the Alexa skill store that are
connected to the account
N/A
Compatible
Device
List of devices that are connected to
Alexa
UUID, name, net-
work state
User
Activity
All interaction between the user and
the connected devices
Conversations,
to-do lists,
music playlists,
notifications
Audio
Data
Voice recordings of the user N/A
Table I
DATA CATEGORIES DESCRIBED BY CHUNG ET AL. [6]
Category Description Examples
Device Data All information about the
device as such
Name, serial number,
timezone, region
Connectivity Information about
the device’s network
connections
Wifi credentials,
Bluetooth pairings, IP
and MAC addresses
User Data Data related to the func-
tionality of the device
Calendars, lists, alarms,
history, music
Application
Data
Data regarding the soft-
ware running on the Echo
user credentials, versions,
Client ID, Product ID
Table II
DATA CATEGORIES DESCRIBED BY LI ET AL. [12]
al. [12] focused on data associated with a specific Amazon
Echo device. Therefore, their findings present a subset of the
data identified by Chung et al.
III. METHODOLOGY
The focus of this paper is collecting and interpreting evid-
ence specifically coming from the various APIs that the Alexa
voice service provides. The first goal of this research was to
determine specifically which data is stored on Amazon’s serv-
ers when using the Alexa voice service on an Amazon Echo
device. To do this, an example Echo device was populated with
simulated user data. The seven categories of data established
by Chung et al. [6] were used as a basis for this, which helped
to make sure that all areas of the device’s functionality are
covered. The data was injected using specific crafted voice
commands and menu interactions to make sure that the results
were reproducible and to keep it as realistic as possible. After
executing these actions and therefore filling the device with
data, all known Alexa APIs were accessed to retrieve any data
stored by Amazon, and the API responses were saved locally
in the format they were delivered in.
Extracting the dataset from the Alexa API turned out to
be a very complex and time-consuming task. To be able to
do this, the Burp Suite software was used to intercept data
Figure 1. Proxy Infrastructure
packets being sent from Amazon’s servers to the local browser
when accessing the Alexa Web page. An obstacle for this
was that Amazon encrypts all communication with this Web
page with TLS. Additionally, it uses HTTP Strict Transport
Security (HSTS), which prevents downgrade attacks [13].
This made it necessary to install the Root CA certificate that
Portswigger [14] provides for this situation, as it enables Burp
Suite to generate trusted server certificates when intercepting
TLS connections. Burp Suite and Google Chrome were then
set up in such a way that all communication with the domains
alexa.amazon.com and alexa.amazon.co.uk was intercepted
by Burp Suite and stored. The general infrastructure of
this proxy connection can be seen in Figure 1. Then, the
browser was used to manually access every available menu
and functionality on the Web application, which subsequently
caused it to request data from every relevant API. This was
essentially active Web scraping of the Alexa Website. The
proxy connection was used to automatically store all the raw
JSON responses of any API that was accessed through the
Website. The main points of interest here were the URL of
the request and the response payload. Since all Alexa API
calls return data in JSON format, it was straightforward to
filter out the relevant packets in Burp Suite through their
MIME type. All these packets were then exported to a file.
Burp Suite’s export function generates an XML file structure
that contains the requests and responses including all metadata
and payloads from the selected packets, which meant that a
lot of the information was irrelevant for this purpose. Also,
the file structure was hard to use, since it was comprised
of single JSON structures for all the responses embedded in
XML. Using a Python script, this data was converted into a
simpler JSON format. The resulting file was then manually
cleaned up. Duplicates were removed, as well as APIs that
either did not contain any relevant data in the response, or
did not return any response. The raw data files that were
produced in this manner were too large to be included directly
in this paper. They can however be accessed on GitHub
under https://github.com/cleminator/AlexaPaperDatasets. This
method uncovered a list of APIs, some of which have not
yet been mentioned in the literature presented in section II-B.
Table III lists all the APIs found. However, only a subset of
them will be analysed in more detail in section IV.
APIs
/api/activities /api/kedevice
/api/activity/privacy-link /api/language
/api/allowed-providers /api/lemur/access/
/api/amazon-music-benefits /api/lists/fetchUserPreference
/api/app-version-info /api/lists/linkedPartners
/api/available-mid-field /api/lists/listPartners
/api/bluetooth /api/media/historical-queues
/api/bootstrap /api/metrics-batch
/api/cards /api/music-account-details
/api/communications/providers /api/music/curated
/api/customer-status /api/music/settings
/api/detect-first-run-devices /api/namedLists
/api/device-preferences /api/namedLists/ZZZ/items
/api/device-wifi-details /api/notifications
/api/devices-v2/device /api/np/player
/api/dnd/device-status-list /api/np/queue
/api/dnd/schedule /api/partner-authorization/details
/api/feature-alert /api/phoenix
/api/feature-alert-location /api/salmon/preferences
/api/featureaccess-v3 /api/server-image
/api/gadgets/XXX/YYY/device-
gadgets
/api/strings
/api/get-customer-pfm /api/third-party
/api/get-languages /api/traffic/settings
/api/video-skills/videoSkills /api/wake-word
/api/household /api/wake-words-locale
Table III
DISCOVERED APIS
As mentioned before, Amazon Echo is a product family
that consists of multiple different device types. It was not
clear whether the choice of device made a difference for how
data was processed. Therefore, these actions were performed
with two different Amazon Echo devices independently. The
same dataset was injected into both devices, so any differences
in the respective API responses would indicate functional
differences between them. In this case, two Amazon Echo
Dots were used, one from the 2nd and one from the most
recent 3rd generation. Separate Amazon Alexa accounts were
created for each device, even though it would have been
possible to connect multiple devices to the same account.
This was done because an Echo device might also change
device-independent settings, which could lead to scenarios
where one device could overwrite data from the other. There
are several differences between the two models. However,
according to Digital Trends [15], these changes are all in
hardware. While these changes may be interesting from a
consumer’s perspective, they should not make any difference
to how data is processed. Since the software appears to
be the same on both devices, the expected result was that
there were no differences in the respective API responses.
Comparing the two datasets mostly confirmed this. Table IV
shows the an overview over the differences. While certain
differences could be found, they were quite subtle, and could
be attributed to slight differences in usage behaviour while
populating the two devices with data as well as different
timestamps, IDs, etc. Additionally of course, certain numbers
and identifiers were different between the two, which can
be attributed to the fact that they are different devices. In
addition to the brief overview in table IV, the full data
sets obtained from both devices can be found on GitHub
API / Information 2nd Gen 3rd Gen
/device-preferences - Contains locale it-IT
/media/historical-
queue
- Different order of music
items
/media/provider-
contenttype-
capabilities
- Different order of music
providers
/namedLists - Different IDs
/notifications - Different IDs
/phoenix/group ApplianceGroup
“Bedroom” is defined
-
/activities - Different items & order
/cards - Different items & order
Software Version 641574820 2584225924
Device Type A3S5BH2HU6VAYF A32DOYMUN6DTXA
Device Serial No. G090*****0W3T G090*****02GD
Device Account ID A098**********G4IM A072**********1ZU0
Customer ID ALU****B42 A1P*****LPH
Customer Email di*******4@gmx.net di*******2@gmx.net
Table IV
ECHO VERSION DIFFERENCES
under https://github.com/cleminator/AlexaPaperDatasets. Due
to their size it was not possible to include them directly.
This result shows, that while there are some differences
between device generations, they do not seem to be relevant
in the context of this research. As such, the remainder of this
paper focuses on the most recent device, the 3rd generation.
Finally, it can be assumed that this research will stay relevant
in the future, as it seems that changes in hardware for Amazon
Echo devices do not significantly impact data processing and
storage. Because of this conclusion, the decision was made to
focus only on the data extracted from the 3rd generation Echo
device from that point on.
IV. API DATA ANALYSIS
Based on the API responses gathered through the method
described above, this section contains a list of Alexa APIs to-
gether with their functionality. Additionally, possible artefacts
and conclusions to be drawn from them are presented. This
section is supposed to give an overview of certain artefacts
to be found in Alexa API responses. In practice, this will be
highly dependent on the specific situation, so certain aspects
described here may not apply. This information can, however,
be used as a baseline of possible areas to investigate.
A. Activities
API: https://alexa.amazon.com/api/activities
This API returns a list of previous voice interactions with
Amazon Alexa on the account that is currently logged in.
Each entry contains several pieces of information, including a
transcript of the command, a timestamp, information about the
device the command was given to and data about the given
response. Additionally, a so-called utterance ID is included,
which is linked to the actual audio recording of the command.
Since this API summarises all communication between
the user and Alexa, it can provide an investigator with a
good insight into the user’s behaviour, habits and possibly
also whereabouts. Certain commands may contain location
information that can be useful in an investigation. When a
user asks for information about the weather, for example,
Alexa responds with data about a specific location. If the
user does not specify a location, Alexa uses the one that is
set as default, which is usually where the device is placed.
This location information combined with the time stamp
included can be a hint towards a person’s whereabouts at a
specific time. While the user could potentially issue commands
through his smartphone from anywhere, the investigator can
find out specifically from which device the command was
given through the device ID that is part of the response. Other
commands, such as asking for traffic information may provide
similar conclusions. This API is essential for understanding
the user’s behaviour around his Echo devices. Because the
response is likely to be very large and hard to read depending
on the number of interactions, it may be sensible to visualise
the events as a timeline.
As part of each entry, a value called "activityStatus" is
provided. For successful interactions, this value is set to "SUC-
CESS". In some cases, however, entries may have the status
"DISCARDED_NON_DEVICE_DIRECTED_INTENT". This
means that an Echo device started recording because it de-
tected the defined wake word, which then turned out to be
a false positive. Even though in this case no command was
executed, there are still voice recordings associated with it,
which may contain sensitive information through background
noise, as well as indicate the suspect’s whereabouts.
B. Bluetooth
API: https://alexa.amazon.com/api/bluetooth
Amazon provides the possibility to connect Echo devices to
external speakers through Bluetooth. The information about
paired devices can be accessed through this API. It returns a
list of devices including their respective pairings and contains
details such as the device’s serial number, device type, and
friendly name, as well as the friendly names of the Bluetooth
devices and their current connection states.
In certain instances, the information about the connected
devices may be of interest, as it can potentially be used to
identify further devices to be analysed.
C. Bootstrap & Household
APIs:
https://alexa.amazon.com/api/bootstrap
https://alexa.amazon.com/api/household
These two APIs return basic information about the account that
is logged in. Bootstrap simply contains the registered name of
the user, their email address and a customer ID. More than one
user can be associated with an account. Household provides
some more details for each of them, namely their first and full
names, a parameter called "role", which can be "ADULT" or
"CHILD" and their respective IDs.
These IDs are included in several other APIs, such as
Activities, and allow an investigator to associate interactions
with a specific user.
D. Cards
API: https://alexa.amazon.com/api/cards
Recent interactions with Alexa are displayed in a tile-based
layout of cards by both the Web and mobile management
applications, with each card corresponding to a particular
action. There is a lot of overlap between this API and activities,
as they both contain the same data, but formatted differently.
E. Contacts
API: https://alexa-comms-mobile-service.amazon.co.uk/user/
XYZ/contacts
This API returns a list of all contacts registered in the address
book of the current Alexa account. This includes their name,
phone numbers, email addresses, postal address and more.
There are two different types of contacts to be found here.
The user can manually add contacts to their address book, or
give the Alexa companion application permission to import
all contacted from their smartphone. Permissions are acquired
at login time. This can be very valuable information for an
investigator, as it might give him access to a suspect’s contacts
without needing to access their phone.
F. Device Preferences
API: https://alexa.amazon.com/api/device-preferences
As the name suggests, this API returns information about all
Echo devices registered to the account. First of all, there is data
about the device itself, such as its serial number, device type,
and the associated account ID. Secondly, detailed information
about the device’s location and language settings is included
in the form of a locale and time zone setting, and an address
field comprised of country, county, city, postal code, street,
and number. Additionally, it contains settings for temperature
and distance units.
While the information might be useful to an investigator,
it should be noted that the user can manually adjust these
settings, so they should not be blindly trusted. Instead, they
should be cross-referenced with location information from
other APIs, such as Activities.
G. WiFi Details
API: https://alexa.amazon.com/api/device-wifi-details
When invoked with a device’s serial number as a parameter,
this API responds with information about the wireless network
settings of said device. Specifically, the response parameters
are the device’s MAC address, its serial number and device
type, as well the ESSID of the network it is connected to.
Even though this is not very detailed, there are still con-
clusions to be drawn from this information. The information
on which wireless network the device is connected to can be
used to gather further information. By knowing which network
was used, the investigator can attempt to collect information
from other devices in that network, or possibly even gather
network logs that might contain more evidence. The fact that
the Echo device’s MAC address is also included here can
help to identify traffic coming specifically from this device.
It should be noted, however, that the traffic between an Echo
device and Amazon’s servers is usually encrypted.
H. Devices
API: https://alexa.amazon.com/api/devices-v2
Similarly to the Device Preferences API described above,
this one provides details about the devices registered to the
account. Compared to Device Preferences, this API contains
more technical data, which may be interesting. The parameters
include the device’s MAC address, device family, software
version, device type, whether it is online at the moment, its
friendly name and whether it is currently being charged.
The information about the device’s type and software ver-
sion could be used by an investigator to identify known
weaknesses or vulnerabilities that may allow them to directly
access the device and gather further evidence. In some cases,
several devices might be registered to a single account, in
which case the information from this API can support an
investigator’s efforts to identify them and to associate their
preferences with the physical devices. This could be done for
example through the MAC address or device type.
I. Named Lists
API: https://alexa.amazon.com/api/namedlists
As the name already suggests, this API can be used to gather
data about any lists that are kept in the account. Two default
lists always exist, namely "To-do" and "Shopping". However,
other lists with custom names can be arbitrarily created by
the user. Each list contains several items, which can be
marked "completed". Both the lists and the entries in them are
identified by an ID. The API takes a list ID as a parameter and
returns only data about that list. The API response contains all
entries associated with the list, which includes their respective
IDs, names, whether they are marked completed, as well as
timestamps for when they were created and last updated. If no
parameter is given, the API responds with the IDs and names
of all lists, as well as creation and update timestamps for the
whole lists, rather than single items.
Since these lists can be used for any purpose, their useful-
ness to an investigator highly depends on how much and for
what the suspect was using them. Generally, the timestamps
may be of interest, as they allow the entries to be included
in a general event timeline, where they might provide more
context to the situation.
J. Phoenix
API: https://alexa.amazon.com/api/phoenix
The Amazon Alexa ecosystem allows users to place several
devices in their homes to form a complete smart home system.
For management purposes, Amazon provides the functionality
to create different groups of devices, assign devices to certain
rooms, associate Echo devices with connected appliances and
more. The Phoenix API returns this structure.
An investigator could use that information to find further
devices that might be relevant to the investigation. For ex-
ample, if an investigator is trying to establish what happened
in a certain room in a suspect’s house, they could use this
API’s response to find other devices in that same room.
Figure 2. Alexa Voice History
K. Utterance
API: https://alexa.amazon.com/api/utterance/audio/data
This API is different from the others because it is the only one
that does not return data in JSON format. When a user gives a
voice command to an Echo device, that command is recorded
and sent to Amazon’s server for processing. There, the intent
behind the command is detected, a response formulated and
returned to the device. The voice recordings are then stored on
the servers indefinitely, as recently confirmed by Amazon [16].
The utterance API can be used to access any voice recording
associated with the currently authenticated account. The audio
files are referenced through an utterance ID, which can be
found in the entries of the Activities API, as described above.
These recordings can be of great interest to an investigator
because they allow them to tie interactions with the device to
a physical person through their voice. If a device has multiple
users, the audio can be used to discern who triggered which
commands. Furthermore, in certain cases, the recordings might
contain additional information in the form of background
noise. Allegedly, Amazon employees found a recording where
sexual assault could be heard in the background, which shows
the potential relevance of this [1].
V. USER PRIVACY ASPECTS
Amazon provides a number of options for users to control
certain privacy aspects of their accounts. As the last part of
this research, these settings were reviewed.
In the Amazon Alexa settings menu, there is a specific
section for Alexa Privacy1. In this section, the user can manage
certain privacy aspects around Alexa and their Echo devices,
as well as access the Amazon Privacy Note which explains
what Amazon may do with personal information. The first
option, Review Voice History, allows the user to see a list of
all recent voice interactions with Alexa. The user can choose
a date range to filter entries. For each entry, a transcription of
the voice command is shown along with a timestamp and the
device it was given to. The user can also listen to the audio
recordings associated with the commands. Figure 2 shows an
excerpt of this menu. Additionally, it is possible to delete
entries from the interaction history. This can be done for single
entries, certain time frames or the whole history.
1https://www.amazon.co.uk/hz/mycd/myx\#/home/alexaPrivacy/home
To test whether deleting entries from the Alexa interaction
history actually removes the data associated with them, several
scenarios were tested. For each case, a new voice command
such as "What’s the weather in Edinburgh?" was given to
the Echo device. After that, the respective entry was accessed
through the Activities API, the Cards API, the Voice History
menu in the Alexa privacy settings and the Utterance API.
For each scenario, the entry was deleted through one of the
methods described below. Then, all APIs were accessed again
to find out whether the data was actually deleted.
The settings of the Alexa Web page contain a menu called
History2, that shows all recent interactions and lets the user
delete them (figure 3). Deleting an entry from this view made
the biggest impact. After that, the entries in both the Activities
and the Cards API were no longer available via the API.
Additionally, the associated voice recording was also deleted.
Each card on the homepage of both the Alexa Web page
and companion app has a Remove card button with which they
can be deleted.When the respective card was deleted, that card
was no longer returned by the API, nor shown on the Alexa
Web page or app. The entry in the Activities API and the audio
recording were still available and unchanged.
As described above, the Alexa privacy menu contains the
option to delete voice recordings (figure 2). When the voice
recording was deleted through this option it was no longer
available via the Utterance API However, the entries in both
the Activities and the Cards API were still available, including
any metadata associated with it. Therefore, deleting entries
from the voice history in the Alexa privacy settings specifically
only removes audio recordings, and not any metadata.
None of the other known APIs were changed by any of these
actions. Even if an entry is fully deleted, it may therefore still
be possible to reconstruct the action that was performed using
timestamps and other metadata from other APIs. If a suspect,
for example, asked Alexa to add certain suspicious items to
their shopping list using a voice command, and then deleted
this interaction using the methods above to cover their tracks,
an investigator could still use the information returned by /api/
namedlists to acquire these items as well as the timestamps
from when they were added and last modified. Using the fact
that certain information is stored redundantly and available
through multiple APIs can be a legitimate strategy against anti-
forensics attempts.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The first goal of this research was to determine how Amazon
processed and stored data about the users of Amazon Echo
devices. To do this, the test device was first populated with
simulated user data by issuing certain voice commands to
the device and changing settings in the Alexa companion
application. To determine the format in which that data was
stored, it was then retrieved again through a list of APIs. By
crawling through the Alexa Web application and recording
any calls to an API using Burpsuite, additional APIs could
2https://alexa.amazon.co.uk/spa/index.html\#settings/dialogs
Figure 3. Alexa Interaction History
be found. All responses from the known APIs were then
downloaded and correlated with the dataset that was injected
into the device in the first place. To determine whether the
choice of device hardware somehow influenced the structure
of the data, this was done using the Amazon Echo Dot’s 2nd
generation and 3rd generation. When comparing the two results
it was determined that there were no significant changes in
the datasets. This lead to the conclusion that the choice of
hardware did not make a difference to the data stored by
Amazon. This also indicated that the results of this research
will stay relevant in the future including future releases of the
device. Because there is no official documentation of the APIs,
all knowledge about them comes from exploratory work. In the
future, Amazon might change their structure to accommodate
new features, which means that this type of research must be
performed regularly for investigators to keep being able to use
them. However, it was shown that new hardware versions to
not affect the APIs, which allows investigators to perform the
same type of analysis for multiple devices. The evaluation of
the APIs also showed that a lot of information was stored in
multiple places, spread over different APIs. An investigator
can potentially use this to determine whether a suspect tried
to delete data to cover their tracks. Generally, most of the
APIs store metadata such as timestamps, device information
or location data. This facilitates the investigators’ ability to
determine an event timeline. Section IV provides investigators
with a list of known APIs, as well as a detailed analysis
of potential artefacts that can be found in their respective
responses. Some of these will not be relevant for certain
scenarios, but they generally provide the investigator with
valuable information about how to gather digital evidence.
Finally, Amazon’s privacy settings were reviewed. Out of
the options presented to the user, the Voice History is the most
interesting one. It allows the user to review all past voice
commands issued to Alexa, including the voice recordings.
The user can also delete selected entries or whole ranges.
The functionality presented by this menu is similar to the two
APIs Cards and Activities, both of which also show interaction
history in different formats, as described in section IV. It is
possible for the user to delete entries from any of these lists,
which led to the question of whether there are any differences
in the data that is actually deleted. It was shown that deleting
an entry through the History menu in the settings of the Alexa
Web pageled to the most comprehensive deletion. However, it
should be noted that entries in other APIs are unaffected by
this, which might still enable someone with access to all APIs
to make conclusions about the user’s behaviour. This is a very
important insight for investigators because it means that even
if a suspect tries to cover their tracks, some artefacts may
still be available. Also, because a lot of the information is
somewhat redundant as it is available through more than one
API, the investigator might even be able to detect attempts of
anti-forensics techniques.
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